The Hidden Power of the New Economic Sanctions by Gordon, Joy
Loyola University Chicago 
Loyola eCommons 
Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other 
Works 
Faculty Publications and Other Works by 
Department 
2019 
The Hidden Power of the New Economic Sanctions 
Joy Gordon 
Loyola University Chicago, cgordon3@luc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/philosophy_facpubs 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gordon, Joy. The Hidden Power of the New Economic Sanctions. Current History, 118, 804: 3-10, 2019. 
Retrieved from Loyola eCommons, Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works, 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications and Other Works by Department 
at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works by an 
authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. 
© Current History, 2019. 
3In 1919, trying to persuade the United States to join the League of Nations, President Wood-row Wilson touted the “boycott”—the League’s 
primary tool of enforcement—as a powerful yet 
bloodless means of stopping war:
A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in 
sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peace-
ful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no 
need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not 
cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it 
brings a pressure upon that nation which, in my 
judgment, no modern nation could resist. 
While blockades and sieges have been used as 
forms of warfare since ancient times, the twen-
tieth century saw the introduction of economic 
measures as a powerful means of enforcing in-
ternational law. Sanctions were described by Wil-
son and others since in odd, contradictory terms. 
They were unlike warfare—there were no planes, 
bombs, or bullets involved. Yet their power was 
precisely in the damage they could do, even if that 
damage was less obvious and seemed less violent. 
This tension is still at the heart of current trends in 
how sanctions are formulated, applied, and justi-
fied.
In the past twenty years, the development of tar-
geted “smart” sanctions has been widely viewed as 
resolving the core tension in the use of economic 
sanctions. They are seen as ensuring the effective-
ness of sanctions, while sparing vulnerable popu-
lations from the collateral damage that occurred in 
the past. But how they have worked in practice is 
very different.
There have been two broad trends in the use of 
sanctions in the past two decades. First, contrary 
to the standard narrative of the rise of precision-
targeted sanctions, they are, with some consis-
tency, systemic. They seek to undermine systems 
on which the target country’s core functionality 
depends: its access to the international banking 
network, its imports and exports, and its energy 
sector. The second trend is the evolution of com-
plex arrangements that serve to obscure the sanc-
tioner’s role, particularly in regard to the humani-
tarian damage done.
UNCONSTRAINED POWER
After World War II, sanctions were included 
among the options available to the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) to respond to aggression 
and threats to international peace and security. 
But they were rarely used; the mutual veto pow-
ers of the permanent members meant that the 
UNSC’s enforcement powers were largely paralyzed. 
Sanctions were used by national governments to 
achieve foreign policy objectives, but their impact 
was limited. Comprehensive sanctions were not 
possible, since any country that was targeted by 
the Americans or the Soviets could simply turn 
to the other bloc for its trade. When the United 
States embargoed Cuba, the Castro regime could 
still trade with the Soviet bloc. Consequently, the 
humanitarian impact was limited as well.
While sieges and blockades had long been seen 
as devastating and indiscriminate, it was not at all 
clear that this might be true of economic measures 
outside the context of war. For the duration of the 
Cold War, scholars writing about sanctions were 
mostly concerned with how effective they might be 
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at pressuring the target state to change its behav-
ior, or how long an alliance of sanctioning states 
could stay intact without defections as shortages 
of goods drove up prices and created opportunities 
for profiteering. There was little discussion about 
the humanitarian impact of sanctions, apart from 
the case of South Africa.
At the end of the 1980s, sanctions were widely 
seen as a humane and effective route to political 
reform in South Africa—imposing them on the 
apartheid regime drew little criticism except from 
the Reagan administration. So when Iraq invaded 
Kuwait in 1990, there was considerable enthu-
siasm on the part of nearly everyone, from paci-
fists to US military leaders, for the imposition of 
sanctions on Iraq. But the UNSC had just under-
gone a radical transformation. The Soviet Union 
was collapsing and no longer a counterweight to 
the Western permanent members, while China 
showed no interest in contesting their influence. 
For the first time since its inception, the vast pow-
ers of the UNSC under the UN 
Charter could be exercised to 
their fullest.
Under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, in response to threats 
to international peace and 
security the UNSC has broad 
discretion to impose an ar-
ray of measures that “may in-
clude” severing diplomatic ties, prohibiting travel 
and communication, cutting off trade, and using 
military force. Once such measures are adopted by 
the UNSC, all member states of the UN are required 
to implement them. There is no provision in the 
Charter by which a member state may question 
the UNSC’s decision, or decline to implement the 
measures it has adopted. A country subject to such 
measures could not look to an ally or an opposing 
bloc for trade or military support, since virtually 
every nation in the world would be bound to en-
force the UNSC’s decisions.
That is what happened to Iraq. In response to 
its invasion of Kuwait, the UNSC imposed nearly 
comprehensive sanctions, prohibiting both im-
ports and exports. They were disruptive from the 
start, since Iraq was so dependent on oil exports 
for its income, and was highly dependent on im-
ports for everything from food to equipment for its 
infrastructure. Initially it was not even permitted 
to import food.
But the real damage did not occur until the first 
Persian Gulf War in the winter of 1991, when a 
coalition led by the United States conducted a 
massive bombing campaign that devastated Iraq’s 
industrial capacity, its electrical generators, its 
telecommunications system, its water and sewage 
treatment plants, and most of its bridges, dams, and 
major roads. The global sanctions then prevented 
Iraq from importing the equipment and materials 
needed to repair and rebuild its infrastructure. In 
any case, the ban on oil exports meant that Iraq 
could not generate the income needed to pay for 
these goods.
The humanitarian impact was immediate and 
severe. Iraqis suffered epidemics of cholera and 
typhoid, widespread malnutrition, and the near-
collapse of health care and education. This crisis 
gave rise to considerable tension within the UN, 
as UNICEF and other agencies—as well as many 
of the UNSC’s members—pressed the UNSC to al-
low humanitarian goods into Iraq. While Iraq was 
permitted to import food after 1991, sanctions 
continued to block much of what was needed to 
meet the population’s needs 
for potable water, nutrition, 
and adequate medical care.
In the mid-1990s, under 
the Oil for Food Program, 
Iraq was allowed to sell lim-
ited amounts of oil, the pro-
ceeds from which could then 
be used to purchase humani-
tarian goods. But even then the UNSC permitted 
very few imports that could be used to rehabili-
tate the country’s foundering infrastructure. Al-
though food could be imported freely, the trucks 
needed to distribute it could not. When the UNSC 
approved the purchase of a new water treatment 
plant, it blocked the electrical generator needed to 
run it, claiming that it had potential military uses 
in addition to its civilian uses. Such restrictions 
drew broad criticism internationally and within 
the UN, as well as from the Red Cross and other 
organizations. For over a decade, the Iraqi popula-
tion continued to suffer.
‘SMART’ SANCTIONS
It was in this context that targeted sanctions—
also known as “smart sanctions”—emerged. In 
contrast to the comprehensive sanctions imposed 
on Iraq, smart sanctions primarily consisted of 
narrowly tailored financial restrictions and as-
set freezes, commodity and arms embargoes, and 
travel restrictions. They were envisioned as a 
means of having a powerful impact on individual 
Targeted sanctions are said 
to bear no resemblance to 
indiscriminate past measures.
wrongdoers by targeting their personal assets or 
their freedom to travel, or by blocking their ac-
cess to weapons. The expectation was that these 
targeted measures would not do the kind of broad, 
indiscriminate harm to vulnerable sectors of the 
population that was seen in Iraq.
Since the late 1990s, considerable effort and ex-
pertise has gone into the design and implementa-
tion of targeted sanctions. The Swiss government 
facilitated a series of discussions on targeted finan-
cial sanctions, known as the “Interlaken Process.” 
In 1999 and 2000, the German government spon-
sored the “Bonn-Berlin Process,” a series of expert 
seminars and workshops on arms embargoes and 
travel restrictions. The “Stockholm Process,” in 
2002, was an initiative of the Swedish government 
concerning many different aspects of targeted 
sanctions. In 2009, the Targeted Sanctions Con-
sortium was established at the Graduate Institute 
in Geneva. The UN, several national governments, 
scholars, the banking industry, and other affected 
commercial sectors all have continued to invest 
great effort in refining the design and use of tar-
geted sanctions.
The view commonly held by these actors is that, 
while the Iraq sanctions regime was tragic, things 
have changed dramatically. In March 2016, US 
Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew stated: 
Not long ago, conventional wisdom dismissed 
sanctions as blunt, ineffective instruments. The 
old model was a countrywide embargo, which 
provided little flexibility to mitigate dispropor-
tionate costs on innocent civilians—both in the 
targeted countries and here at home. At the same 
time, early efforts to ensure humanitarian relief 
sometimes fell short of the intended goal. The 
sanctions we employ today are different. They 
are informed by financial intelligence, strategi-
cally designed, and implemented with our pub-
lic and private partners to focus pressure on bad 
actors and create clear incentives to end malign 
behavior, while limiting collateral impact.
Asset freezes sometimes have been described as 
the quintessential form of targeted sanctions. They 
involve formulating blacklists of specific persons, 
companies, and foundations, and imposing severe 
penalties on banks, insurers, manufacturers, and 
others that do business with these “specially des-
ignated nationals.” On the surface, these very spe-
cific lists seem to demonstrate what the political 
scientist Clara Portela has called a “trend toward 
the personalization and individualization of mea-
sures in the field of peace and security.”
The targeted sanctions that are employed these 
days, it is often said, bear no resemblance to the 
damaging, indiscriminate measures of the past. To-
day’s sanctions may be imperfect, since no policy 
of this complexity could ever be completely suc-
cessful in every possible situation. Nonetheless, 
this narrative suggests, any damage to vulnerable 
populations is unintended, and any “collateral 
damage” is marginal.
In fact, this is not at all the case. At best such 
claims apply, in some sense, to the sanctions im-
posed by the UNSC. Since the early 1990s, very few 
of its sanctions regimes have—on their face—im-
posed broad restrictions on core sectors of a tar-
get state’s economy. But the same cannot be said 
of sanctions regimes imposed by national govern-
ments, in particular the United States, or regional 
bodies, especially the European Union. And on 
closer inspection, it seems that even UNSC sanc-
tions are often designed to do broad damage to 
the target country’s economy, albeit by circuitous 
means.
SYSTEMIC PUNISHMENT
Recent years have seen increasing sophistica-
tion in the sanctions that do the greatest damage to 
critical networks or functions of a target country’s 
economy and infrastructure. While these have be-
come increasingly common over the past decade, 
the template can be seen in the sanctions the Unit-
ed States imposed on Cuba in the early and mid-
1990s on top of the long-running embargo.
Up until 1990, 85 percent of Cuba’s trade was 
with the Soviets and the Eastern Bloc. When the 
Soviet Union dissolved, Cuba’s economy went 
into free fall. The government scrambled to estab-
lish new trade partnerships in Europe and Latin 
America and sought foreign investors. The tour-
ism industry was rebuilt rapidly, and Cuba took 
measures to increase its leading exports, sugar 
and nickel. The country also had a strong science 
infrastructure including over fifty biotechnology 
centers, a burgeoning industry that was seen as a 
promising source of revenue.
In 1992 and 1996, the United States enacted 
the Torricelli Act and the Helms-Burton Act, laws 
that directly targeted each of Cuba’s econom-
ic strengths and vulnerabilities. Any ships that 
docked in Cuba were prohibited from docking in 
a US port for six months, making all imports and 
exports more costly and difficult. Foreign manu-
facturers could not send products to the United 
States containing even trace amounts of Cuban 
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materials, including nickel and sugar. Foreign in-
vestors who built hotels or industrial plants on 
properties that had been owned prior to 1959 by 
Cubans who were now US citizens could be sued 
in US courts for “trafficking” in these properties. 
Washington prohibited foreign banks from engag-
ing in transactions with Cuba involving US dollars, 
which meant additional costs and difficulties for 
Cuba in all its foreign trade. US companies were 
specifically prohibited from exporting to Cuba any 
equipment or materials that could be used in de-
veloping or marketing biotech products.
These restrictions in fact applied not only to US 
persons and businesses, but also to foreign com-
panies that were subsidiaries of US corporations. 
This “extraterritorial” reach drew considerable 
indignation from the international community; 
Canada, Mexico, and the EU adopted retaliatory 
legislation. Even so, the bottom line was that for-
eign companies could not invest in Cuba without 
risking their access to the US market, as well as the 
costs of litigation and potential penalties imposed 
by the US Treasury Department.
This became the template for US sanctions re-
gimes for the next two decades: measures designed 
to do maximum harm by neutralizing an econo-
my’s greatest strengths and exploiting its vulner-
abilities. They were imposed alongside measures 
that compromised the country’s access to the in-
ternational banking system and to the infrastruc-
ture for all of its imports and exports.
The United States has imposed sanctions re-
gimes more frequently, more harshly, and for lon-
ger periods than any other nation in the world. 
The use of sanctions, particularly extraterritorial 
and systemic sanctions, increased greatly under 
the Obama administration, and that practice has 
continued under President Donald Trump. To 
some extent, the United States has been joined by 
like-minded allies, particularly since around 2010. 
Concerned by Iran’s burgeoning nuclear program, 
the EU, which had opposed unilateral US measures 
in the 1990s, joined Washington in imposing 
damaging measures designed to cripple the Ira-
nian economy.
Perhaps the most striking instance was the 
EU’s decision to exclude Iranian banks from the 
Brussels-based Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the mes-
saging hub that facilitates most of the transfers 
among the world’s banks. While there are some 
other avenues for trade or financial transfers, such 
as barter arrangements or the informal hawala sys-
tem used in the Arab world, there is no substitute 
for access to SWIFT, the global standard for inter-
national banking transactions. To expel a nation’s 
banks from SWIFT does immediate and irreparable 
damage to that country’s ability to sell its exports 
or services; to purchase fuel, raw materials, and 
other imports; to transfer funds among businesses 
or family members; and to purchase even those 
humanitarian goods that are ostensibly allowed, 
such as pharmaceuticals. Attracting foreign invest-
ment under a SWIFT ban is exceedingly difficult, 
since fund transfers related to business operations 
become a logistical nightmare.
Iran’s major banks were excluded from access 
to SWIFT from 2012 to 2016. Whatever other dam-
age was done by sanctions, or the Iranian govern-
ment’s economic policies, or anything else, the ex-
pulsion from SWIFT in itself caused immeasurable 
disruption to Iran’s economy.
Sanctions regimes of this kind are indeed “tar-
geted,” but not in the way that is usually meant. 
They do not single out wrongdoers, leaving the 
population as a whole unaffected. They are tar-
geted at the core systems of the country’s economy 
and infrastructure. The design of these measures 
ensures that they will do extensive and indiscrimi-
nate damage to broad sectors of the population.
BANKRUPTING THE STATE
Claiming that a target state is corrupt or en-
gaging in wrongful acts, a sanctioner may impose 
measures to interfere with the state’s assets and 
revenue sources. This can be done by seizing or 
freezing its financial accounts abroad, or prohibit-
ing the purchase of its natural resources, such as 
timber or oil. 
Bankrupting the state can have far-reaching 
consequences for the population as a whole. It 
may lead to job losses in state-run industries, or 
make it impossible to maintain the country’s infra-
structure, or to continue providing social security, 
including pensions, or state subsidies for basic 
goods, such as food and gasoline. For an economy 
that is highly centralized, or a socialist state that 
provides health care, education, and extensive ser-
vices, the damage done by disrupting the state’s 
sources of income will be magnified.
For example, in 2003 the United States ad-
opted the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, 
responding to human rights concerns over the 
actions of Myanmar’s military junta. It targeted 
industries, such as textiles, that were important 
revenue sources for the regime. But US textile 
sanctions affected the industry as whole, which 
may have resulted in the loss of some 60,000 jobs 
in 2003 and 2004.
In 1998, the EU imposed sanctions against Ser-
bia, including state-owned companies, in response 
to the war crimes committed against Kosovo. The 
companies, in turn, were unable to pay salaries 
and pensions to their employees, or to do business 
with the private firms that relied on them.
Recent US sanctions against Venezuela spe-
cifically blocked its efforts to restructure its debt. 
Venezuela has some $65 billion in outstanding 
bonds and is now in default on its debt payments. 
As the government sought to renegotiate the terms 
of its debt with its creditors, Trump issued an ex-
ecutive order in August 2017 prohibiting all “US 
persons”—which the US government considers to 
include many of Venezuela’s creditors in Europe 
and elsewhere, if they use the US financial sys-
tem—from extending new credit for more than 
thirty days, effectively blocking Venezuela from 
restructuring its debt. In addition, the United 
States has blacklisted many 
of Venezuela’s top govern-
ment officials, including all 
those appointed to negoti-
ate with creditors. These 
measures have under-
mined Venezuela’s efforts 
to manage its debt crisis, 
which will surely worsen the humanitarian disas-
ter that is already taking place.
DRAINING ENERGY
No modern economy can function without suf-
ficient gasoline for cars, trucks, and buses, along 
with fuel for industry and for the electrical grid, 
which in turn is necessary to power water and 
sewage treatment plants, telecommunications, 
and domestic consumption. Accordingly, sanc-
tioners have consistently sought to compromise 
target countries’ energy sectors.
In 2010, the European Council adopted mea-
sures specifically targeting “key sectors” in Iran’s 
oil and gas industry. Canada and Switzerland 
banned investment in Iran’s energy sector, as well 
as the sale of goods that could be used in oil and 
gas production.
US sanctions on Iran have been broader than 
those of any other government, restricting or pro-
hibiting investment in the energy sector as well 
as the export and import of gas and petroleum 
products, and blacklisting hundreds of Iranian 
individuals and companies. These measures were 
expanded dramatically in November 2018, follow-
ing the US withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear 
agreement. While the Trump administration has 
encountered some resistance, and has granted 
waivers in some cases to allow other countries to 
continue trading with Iran, the sanctions are de-
signed to compromise Iran’s energy sector as much 
as possible.
CUTTING OFF BANKS
Enormous damage to a target state’s economy 
can be done with great efficiency by cutting off its 
access to the international banking system. While 
such measures may be successful in preventing 
illicit arms transfers or corrupt practices by gov-
ernment officials, they will also compromise a vast 
range of ordinary and essential financial transac-
tions. Those may include everything from family 
members sending remittances to their relatives, to 
payments for food and medicine, or the purchase 
of raw materials and equipment for industry and 
the infrastructure a mod-
ern country needs to func-
tion. 
The target country may 
try to implement some sort 
of workaround, such as 
barter arrangements. But 
any such measures will be 
costly and difficult. There is no adequate substi-
tute for access to the international banking system.
Cutting off a country’s access can be accom-
plished by a variety of means, including expulsion 
from SWIFT. It is also done by blacklisting com-
panies and government institutions, as the United 
States did to many of North Korea’s major banks 
in 2017, including those linked to commerce, ag-
riculture, and industry.
The sanctioner may get the same result by tar-
geting individuals who hold key institutional posi-
tions, such as the head of the central bank. In the 
case of US sanctions, blacklisting means not only 
that the target’s assets are frozen, but that compa-
nies, banks, and creditors in the United States, and 
possibly worldwide, are also prohibited from do-
ing business with these individuals in their insti-
tutional capacities.
SQUEEZING SHIPPING
The sanctions regimes of the past two decades 
have sought to block imports and exports in sev-
eral ways. These include blocking the export of 
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specific commodities, such as oil or timber, and 
interfering in the target country’s access to ship-
ping. The EU has prohibited oil imports from Syria 
and restricted North Korean vessels’ access to Eu-
ropean ports. The US sanctions on Cuba, by pro-
hibiting any ship that docks in Cuba from docking 
in a US port for six months, require Cuba in many 
cases to pay for the transit of goods from, say, Eu-
rope, and then pay for the ship to return empty.
Since no trader or shipowner would transport 
goods without insurance coverage for the cargo, 
sanctioners have increasingly focused their efforts 
on the insurance industry as a way of indirectly com-
promising the target country’s access to shipping. 
The UNSC sanctions on North Korea include prohi-
bitions on providing insurance or other support for 
any shipping that could contribute to North Korea’s 
nuclear or ballistic missile program. But the United 
States, the EU, and Britain prohibit the provision of 
insurance more broadly to include all shipping to or 
from North Korea, as well as restricting transactions 
with its national insurance 
company.
In some cases, sanction-
ers seek to undermine ev-
erything related to ship-
ping. The US sanctions 
against Iran, for example, 
target its access not only to 
shipping, but also to port 
services, marine cargo insurance, and goods that 
can be used in its shipbuilding industry.
OBSCURING RESPONSIBILITY
Although it is often said that the tragic conse-
quences of the sanctions on Iraq have led to re-
forms that ensure sanctions are no longer a “blunt 
instrument” that indiscriminately harms vulnera-
ble populations, we have seen that is quite untrue. 
Sanctioners now make considerable efforts to find 
ways to deny such effects, to minimize their sever-
ity, or to disavow responsibility.
While it is true that the language of UNSC reso-
lutions for many years has not explicitly imposed 
a comprehensive embargo against a target country, 
it may do so in practice by circuitous means. This 
sometimes occurs through the use of what Henry 
Kissinger famously called “constructive ambigu-
ity.” There would certainly be political opposition 
within the UNSC, most notably from Russia and 
China, to proposed sanctions openly designed to 
compromise the target country’s core institutions, 
such as its central bank; or to blanket prohibitions 
affecting shipping, manufacturing, or the energy 
sector. It is rare that the UNSC adopts such mea-
sures explicitly.
Instead, it may adopt resolutions that are suf-
ficiently vague that member states may invoke 
them as authorization to impose harsh and indis-
criminate measures, which then carry the impri-
matur of global governance. Starting in 2006, the 
UNSC adopted a series of resolutions that required 
member states to freeze the assets of anyone with 
ties to Iran’s nuclear weapons or ballistic missile 
programs; to prohibit the export of goods to Iran 
for use in those programs; and to block the transit 
of individuals associated with them. But the UNSC 
also urged member states to “exercise vigilance” 
regarding Iran’s key financial institutions.
For example, the preamble to UNSC Resolution 
1929, adopted in 2010, includes the following 
language: “recalling in particular the need to exer-
cise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian 
banks, including the Central Bank of Iran.” If a 
member of the UNSC had 
proposed a measure that 
explicitly sanctioned the 
central bank, it likely would 
have met with opposition 
from Russia and China, as 
well as some of the UNSC’s 
elected members. But in-
cluding vague terms in the 
preamble was acceptable.
A “like-minded” group—the United States, the 
EU, Canada, Australia, and South Korea—then in-
voked this language to justify national measures 
that were far more extreme than those contained 
in the UNSC resolution. The EU froze the central 
bank’s assets, noting that “it is necessary to re-
quire enhanced vigilance in relation to the activi-
ties of Iran’s credit and financial institutions.” But 
the UNSC could not be accused of imposing mea-
sures that would damage Iran’s overall economy 
by blacklisting its central bank. At the same time, 
the “like-minded” parties could say that it was not 
their choice to do so—they were only complying 
with the instructions of the UNSC.
Perhaps the most effective means by which sanc-
tioners may disavow the results of their policies is 
through the creation of conditions that trigger risk 
assessments by private actors, who then withdraw 
from trade with the targeted country. This is par-
ticularly apparent in US sanctions policy. There are 
a few variations of this strategy, but all of them 
have three components: ambiguous regulations, 
The United States has imposed 
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than any other nation in the world.
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very high penalties, and then a predictable risk 
analysis by banks and other corporations.
In one variation, the US Treasury Department 
first issues regulations that prohibit US banks from 
engaging in financial transfers to government of-
ficials or military leaders in targeted countries. But 
while a bank can check transfers against a pub-
lished list of individuals and companies, it has no 
means of knowing for certain who the end user 
will be, or what the end use of the funds may be. 
When the banks ask for clarification as to what 
constitutes sufficient due diligence on their part, 
they receive no clear guidance. Consequently, they 
may never be sure whether they have met their le-
gal obligations under US regulations.
And the stakes are very high. The United States 
has imposed penalties in the billions of dollars on 
banks that have facilitated improper transactions 
under US law. Most notably, BNP Paribas of France 
agreed to pay a total of $9 billion in penalties in 
2014. Perhaps of even greater concern, its access 
to the US Federal Reserve System was temporarily 
suspended. Since the US dollar is the global reserve 
currency, any international bank that cannot rec-
oncile its dollar transactions through the Federal 
Reserve banks can no longer operate. Such an ex-
clusion is known as the “death penalty” for banks 
in the international arena.
In response to these two conditions—ambigu-
ous regulations and very high stakes—banks and 
corporations typically decide that whatever ben-
efit may be derived from doing business with the 
targeted country is outweighed considerably by 
the risk. Because the requirements for compliance 
with US law are unclear, it is not possible to reduce 
their risk of committing an inadvertent violation. 
So they choose instead to sever all business ties or 
transactions with the targeted country, even those 
that may be legally permitted. This is known as 
“de-risking.”
Since major banks and large corporations often 
evaluate their risk using the same process, the tar-
get country will find it exceedingly difficult to find 
any bank that is willing, for example, to facilitate 
payment for pharmaceuticals, even if they are not 
prohibited by the sanctions. The same obstacles 
confront individuals who wish to send remittanc-
es to family members, humanitarian organizations 
seeking to ship vaccines to the targeted country, 
and charities trying to send funds or goods after an 
earthquake or other natural disaster.
The result is that a unilateral policy by a nation-
al government in effect functions as a denial of ac-
cess to the global banking and insurance sectors, 
compromising not only ordinary trade and com-
merce but even humanitarian transactions that 
are ostensibly permitted. Yet the sanctioner may 
disavow all of this. If banks don’t want to do this 
sort of business with Iran, Cuba, or North Korea, 
it will say, that’s not because the Treasury Depart-
ment has prohibited medical sales or family remit-
tances—these private actors simply choose not to 
do business with shady actors.
SMART AS HELL
It seems that Woodrow Wilson was quite right 
in his depiction of the “boycott” in contradictory 
terms, as somehow both “peaceful” and “deadly” 
at the same time. We might say that its succes-
sor—targeted sanctions—has followed a similar 
path. They were originally envisioned as power-
fully effective, yet humane. Just as the language 
of “smart bombs” conjures up images of surgical 
strikes, the language of “smart sanctions” has us 
imagining a tyrant seething in fury when he finds 
he cannot get at his bank account in Zurich.
The reality is quite different. Bombs may indeed 
be precision-guided; but they may also, with pre-
cision, be aimed at neighborhoods and schools. 
Sanctions may be targeted as well; but the targets 
can include a country’s financial system, its access 
to gasoline and electricity, and its ability to ship its 
goods for export and to find ships that will trans-
port what it needs to operate its infrastructure, or 
to meet the needs of its population. However they 
may have been envisioned, and however they may 
currently be described, what we have seen in the 
past two decades is that “smart sanctions” are par-
ticularly smart at doing great damage, with great 
efficiency, to the fundamental systems needed for 
any nation to function.
Within the UN, from time to time there have 
been calls for reform, including review of sanc-
tions regimes for compliance with international 
humanitarian law. For the most part, those pro-
posals have not come to fruition. The EU courts 
have intervened in some cases, invalidating as-
set freezes where due process was found lacking. 
But US sanctions have even fewer safeguards. The 
president has enormous discretion to impose sanc-
tions—Trump even threatened to punish Ecuador 
with trade sanctions last summer for introducing 
a resolution in favor of breast-feeding at a meeting 
of the World Health Organization.
Within the United States, its sanctions regimes 
draw little opposition since they are almost uni-
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versally seen as an attractive alternative to mea-
sures that are riskier and costlier, such as military 
intervention. Even when US sanctions accelerate a 
humanitarian crisis, as in Venezuela, or compro-
mise the availability of medicines, as in Iran, there 
is little accountability. Presented with a picture 
of a child killed in a bombing, most people will 
feel a sense of tragedy and see the injustice clearly. 
With sanctions, severe damage may be done when 
a country’s exports and imports are paralyzed be-
cause shipping lines cannot obtain insurance cov-
erage to carry their goods. Few people would have 
much interest in the intricacies or moral implica-
tions of marine cargo insurance. Yet as we saw in 
Iraq, the human damage from compromising a na-
tion’s exports and imports may be far greater than 
that caused by an airstrike.  
Sanctions will continue to be used frequently, 
mostly by powerful nations. It will be hard to ar-
ticulate what is morally wrong with them, in part 
because the human costs are so diffuse and grad-
ual. Proponents will keep describing sanctions as 
“smart,” humane, and precise, even while they 
are precisely targeted to do the greatest harm 
possible to the systems on which whole popula-
tions rely. ■
